This commit is contained in:
gcw_4spBpAfv
2026-01-23 11:28:40 +08:00
parent 42bfdd033c
commit 28fb62e5d6
12 changed files with 648 additions and 67 deletions

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
id: t11
name: t11
version: 1.1.10
version: 1.2.1
author: t11
icon: ''
desc: t11

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@@ -27,12 +27,42 @@ add_library(archery_netcore MODULE
target_include_directories(archery_netcore PRIVATE
"${PY_INCLUDE_DIR}"
"${MAIXCDK_PATH}/components/3rd_party/pybind11/pybind11/include"
"${MAIXCDK_PATH}/components/3rd_party/openssl/include"
"${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/third_party" # 添加 nlohmann/json 路径
)
# 尽量减少 .so 体积并增加逆向成本
target_compile_options(archery_netcore PRIVATE
-Os
-ffunction-sections
-fdata-sections
-fvisibility=hidden
-fvisibility-inlines-hidden
)
target_link_options(archery_netcore PRIVATE
-Wl,--gc-sections
-Wl,-s
)
set_target_properties(archery_netcore PROPERTIES
PREFIX ""
SUFFIX "${PY_EXT_SUFFIX}"
)
target_link_libraries(archery_netcore PRIVATE "${PY_LIB}")
# OpenSSL (for AES-256-GCM decrypt)
# 使用 MaixCDK 提供的 OpenSSL 库(在 so/maixcam 目录下)
set(OPENSSL_LIB_DIR "${MAIXCDK_PATH}/components/3rd_party/openssl/so/maixcam")
if(EXISTS "${OPENSSL_LIB_DIR}/libcrypto.so")
target_link_directories(archery_netcore PRIVATE "${OPENSSL_LIB_DIR}")
target_link_libraries(archery_netcore PRIVATE "${PY_LIB}" crypto ssl)
message(STATUS "Using OpenSSL from MaixCDK: ${OPENSSL_LIB_DIR}")
else()
# Fallback: 尝试 find_package 或系统库
find_package(OpenSSL QUIET)
if(OpenSSL_FOUND)
target_link_libraries(archery_netcore PRIVATE "${PY_LIB}" OpenSSL::Crypto OpenSSL::SSL)
else()
message(WARNING "OpenSSL not found in MaixCDK, trying system libraries (may fail)")
target_link_libraries(archery_netcore PRIVATE "${PY_LIB}" crypto ssl)
endif()
endif()

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@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
#include <cstdint>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include <fstream>
#include <array>
#include <algorithm>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "native_logger.hpp"
namespace py = pybind11;
@@ -14,6 +18,29 @@ namespace {
// 配置项
const std::string _cfg_server_ip = "www.shelingxingqiu.com";
const int _cfg_server_port = 50005;
// OTA AEAD format: MAGIC(7) | nonce(12) | ciphertext(N) | tag(16)
constexpr const char* kOtaMagic = "AROTAE1";
constexpr size_t kOtaMagicLen = 7;
constexpr size_t kGcmNonceLen = 12;
constexpr size_t kGcmTagLen = 16;
// 固定 32-byte AES-256-GCM key提高被直接查看的成本不是绝对安全
// 注意:需要与打包端传入的 --aead-key-hex 保持一致。
static std::array<uint8_t, 32> ota_key_bytes() {
// 简单拆分混淆key = a XOR b
static const std::array<uint8_t, 32> a = {
0x92,0x99,0x4d,0x06,0x6f,0xb6,0xa6,0x3d,0x85,0x08,0xbe,0x73,0x5e,0x73,0x4d,0x8a,
0x53,0x88,0xe6,0x99,0xfc,0x10,0x29,0xb9,0x16,0x9b,0xe7,0x0c,0x65,0x21,0x1c,0xce
};
static const std::array<uint8_t, 32> b = {
0xcf,0x60,0xa2,0xc2,0x32,0x7a,0x61,0xb0,0x4c,0x8e,0x8a,0x62,0x31,0xc7,0x82,0xff,
0xec,0xac,0xa1,0x04,0x2a,0x4d,0xaa,0xf2,0xb0,0x5b,0x39,0x2b,0xf4,0xb3,0xad,0xad
};
std::array<uint8_t, 32> k{};
for (size_t i = 0; i < k.size(); i++) k[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(a[i] ^ b[i]);
return k;
}
}
// 定义获取配置的函数
@@ -109,6 +136,103 @@ py::dict json_to_py_dict(const json& j) {
return d;
}
static bool read_file_all(const std::string& path, std::vector<uint8_t>& out) {
std::ifstream ifs(path, std::ios::binary);
if (!ifs) return false;
ifs.seekg(0, std::ios::end);
std::streampos size = ifs.tellg();
if (size <= 0) return false;
ifs.seekg(0, std::ios::beg);
out.resize(static_cast<size_t>(size));
if (!ifs.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(out.data()), size)) return false;
return true;
}
static bool write_file_all(const std::string& path, const uint8_t* data, size_t len) {
std::ofstream ofs(path, std::ios::binary | std::ios::trunc);
if (!ofs) return false;
ofs.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), static_cast<std::streamsize>(len));
return static_cast<bool>(ofs);
}
static bool decrypt_ota_file_impl(const std::string& input_path, const std::string& output_zip_path) {
std::vector<uint8_t> in;
if (!read_file_all(input_path, in)) {
netcore::log_error(std::string("decrypt_ota_file: read failed: ") + input_path);
return false;
}
const size_t min_len = kOtaMagicLen + kGcmNonceLen + kGcmTagLen + 1;
if (in.size() < min_len) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: too short");
return false;
}
if (!std::equal(in.begin(), in.begin() + kOtaMagicLen, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(kOtaMagic))) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: bad magic");
return false;
}
const uint8_t* nonce = in.data() + kOtaMagicLen;
const uint8_t* ct_and_tag = in.data() + kOtaMagicLen + kGcmNonceLen;
const size_t ct_and_tag_len = in.size() - (kOtaMagicLen + kGcmNonceLen);
if (ct_and_tag_len <= kGcmTagLen) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: no ciphertext");
return false;
}
const size_t ciphertext_len = ct_and_tag_len - kGcmTagLen;
const uint8_t* ciphertext = ct_and_tag;
const uint8_t* tag = ct_and_tag + ciphertext_len;
std::vector<uint8_t> plain(ciphertext_len);
int out_len1 = 0;
int out_len2 = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (!ctx) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failed");
return false;
}
bool ok = false;
auto key = ota_key_bytes();
do {
if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: DecryptInit failed");
break;
}
if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, static_cast<int>(kGcmNonceLen), nullptr)) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: set ivlen failed");
break;
}
if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, nullptr, nullptr, key.data(), nonce)) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: set key/iv failed");
break;
}
if (1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, plain.data(), &out_len1, ciphertext, static_cast<int>(ciphertext_len))) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: update failed");
break;
}
if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, static_cast<int>(kGcmTagLen), const_cast<uint8_t*>(tag))) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: set tag failed");
break;
}
if (1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, plain.data() + out_len1, &out_len2)) {
netcore::log_error("decrypt_ota_file: final failed (auth tag mismatch?)");
break;
}
const size_t plain_len = static_cast<size_t>(out_len1 + out_len2);
if (!write_file_all(output_zip_path, plain.data(), plain_len)) {
netcore::log_error(std::string("decrypt_ota_file: write failed: ") + output_zip_path);
break;
}
ok = true;
} while (false);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
// 打包 TCP 数据包
py::bytes make_packet(int msg_type, py::dict body_dict) {
netcore::log_debug(std::string("make_packet msg_type=") + std::to_string(msg_type));
@@ -233,6 +357,17 @@ PYBIND11_MODULE(archery_netcore, m) {
m.def("get_config", &get_config, "Get system configuration");
m.def(
"decrypt_ota_file",
[](const std::string& input_path, const std::string& output_zip_path) {
netcore::log_info(std::string("decrypt_ota_file in=") + input_path + " out=" + output_zip_path);
return decrypt_ota_file_impl(input_path, output_zip_path);
},
py::arg("input_path"),
py::arg("output_zip_path"),
"Decrypt OTA encrypted file (MAGIC|nonce|ciphertext|tag) to plaintext zip."
);
// Minimal demo: return actions for inner_cmd=41 (manual trigger + ack)
m.def("actions_for_inner_cmd", [](int inner_cmd) {
py::list actions;

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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
1. CPP构建命令
cd /mnt/d/code/archery/cpp_ext
rm -rf build && mkdir build && cd build
TOOLCHAIN_BIN=/mnt/d/code/MaixCDK/dl/extracted/toolchains/maixcam/host-tools/gcc/riscv64-linux-musl-x86_64/bin
PYDEV=/mnt/d/code/shooting/python3_lib_maixcam_musl_3.11.6
MAIXCDK=/mnt/d/code/MaixCDK
cmake .. -G Ninja \
-DCMAKE_C_COMPILER="${TOOLCHAIN_BIN}/riscv64-unknown-linux-musl-gcc" \
-DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER="${TOOLCHAIN_BIN}/riscv64-unknown-linux-musl-g++" \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-mcpu=c906fdv -march=rv64imafdcv0p7xthead -mcmodel=medany -mabi=lp64d" \
-DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-mcpu=c906fdv -march=rv64imafdcv0p7xthead -mcmodel=medany -mabi=lp64d" \
-DPY_INCLUDE_DIR="${PYDEV}/include/python3.11" \
-DPY_LIB="${PYDEV}/lib/libpython3.11.so" \
-DPY_EXT_SUFFIX=".cpython-311-riscv64-linux-gnu.so" \
-DMAIXCDK_PATH="${MAIXCDK}"
ninja

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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
1. OTA 下载的时候,为什么使用十六进制下载,读取 URC 事件?
因为使用二进制下载的时候,经常会出现错误,并且会失败?然后最稳定传输的办法,是每次传输的时候,是分块,而且每次分块都要“删/建”http实例。推测原因是因为我们现在是直接传输文件的源代码代码中含有了一些字符串可能和 AT指令重复导致了 AT 模块在解释的时候出错。而使用 16 进制的方式,可以避免这个问题。因为十六进制直接把数据先转成了字符串,然后在设备端再把字符串转成数据,这样就不可能出现 AT的指令从而减少了麻烦。
2. OTA 下载的时候,为什么不用 AT 模块里 HTTPDLFILE 的指令?
因为在测试中发现,使用 HTTPDLFILE其实是下载到了 4G 模块内部,需要重新从模块内部转到存储卡,而且 4G 模块的存储较小,大概只有 40k所以还需要分块来下载和转存比较麻烦于是最终使用了使用读取串口事件的模式。
3. OTA 下载的时候,为什么不用 AT 模块里 HTTPREAD 的指令?
因为之前测试发现READ模式其实是需要多步
3.1. AT+MHTTPCREATE
3.2. AT+MHTTPCFG
3.3. AT+MHTTPREQUEST
3.4. AT+MHTTPREAD
它其实也是把数据下载到 4g 模块的缓存里,然后再从缓存里读取出来。所以也是比较繁琐的,还不如 HTTPDLFILE 简单。
4.
4.

41
design_doc/todo.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
你现在要防的是“别人拿到设备/拿到代码包后,能伪造请求、刷接口、下发恶意 OTA、甚至劫持通信”。单靠隐藏 Python 源码只能提高门槛,真正的安全要靠协议和密钥设计。结合你仓库里实际内容,建议你重点隐藏/整改这些点(按风险排序)。
1. 必须隐藏/必须整改(高风险)
1.1 登录口令规则太弱(几乎等于明文)
你现在的登录是 password = device_id + "."(见 network.py 读取设备 ID 后直接拼出来),这意味着只要攻击者知道/猜到 device_id就能直接登录伪装设备。
相关位置:
with open("/device_key", "r") as f: device_id = f.read().strip() ... self._device_id = device_id self._password = device_id + "."
1.2 HTTP 鉴权 token 的盐值是硬编码常量(泄露后可离线伪造)
你 token 是 HMAC-SHA256((SALT+device_id), SALT2),而 SALT/SALT2 是固定字符串:"shootMessageFire" / "shoot"。这类“硬编码盐值 + 可猜/可读的 device_id”意味着攻击者只要拿到代码包/逆向 .so就能在自己电脑上批量算 token伪造 HTTP 请求。
相关位置:
SALT = "shootMessageFire"SALT2 = "shoot"return "Arrow_" + hmac.new((SALT + device_id).encode(), SALT2.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
1.3 TLS 配置目前看起来没有做证书校验(容易被中间人攻击)
config.py 虽然 USE_TCP_SSL=True但你在 network.py 里实际把 MSSLCFG="auth" 固定成 0不验且写证书分支被 if False 禁用了。这样“看起来是 TLS”但仍可能被抓包/篡改/假服务器接入。
相关位置:
r = hardware_manager.at_client.send(f'AT+MSSLCFG="auth",{ssl_id},0', "OK", 3000)...if False: # 写证书/校验被禁用 ...r = hardware_manager.at_client.send(f'AT+MIPCFG="ssl",{link_id},{ssl_id},1', "OK", 3000)
1.4 OTA 下发“url”如果缺少强校验就是远程代码执行入口
你 OTA 逻辑里从服务器指令拿到 url 就去下载并替换文件/重启(这是正常 OTA但安全性取决于
是否只允许白名单域名/路径
是否强制 https 并校验服务器证书
是否对 OTA 包做签名校验(最关键)
你这里能看到固定域名 static.shelingxingqiu.com 的特殊处理ota_manager.py 里还在纠结 http/https这块一定要“服务端签名 + 设备端验签”,否则隐藏源码也没用。
2. 建议隐藏(中风险,但很容易被人利用)
2.1 所有服务器地址/端口/API 路径(可被用于扫描、压测、撞库、协议逆向)
这些在 config.py 是明文:
SERVER_IP = "stcp.shelingxingqiu.com"SERVER_PORT = 50005HTTP_URL = "http://ws.shelingxingqiu.com"HTTP_API_PATH = "/home/shoot/device_fire/arrow/fire"
注意:即使你把它们藏进 .so攻击者仍可能通过抓包/观察 DNS/SNI/流量拿到域名或 IP所以“隐藏”只能降低静态分析风险不能替代鉴权/签名。
2.2 WiFi 凭证落盘位置
你会把 SSID/密码写到 /boot/wifi.ssid 和 /boot/wifi.passnetwork.py/wifi.py 都有)。拿到设备存储就能读到明文密码,这属于设备侧安全问题。
2.3 日志/调试信息泄露
你仓库里 .cursor/debug.log* 已经记录了完整的 AT+MIPOPEN ... host:port 等信息;如果这些被打进包或被用户导出,也会泄露通信细节。
你发布包里“真正会被带走的敏感内容”
你现在 app.yaml 的打包清单只包含核心运行文件(不包含 test/、backup_code/、.cursor/ 等),这一点很好:
files: - app.yaml - at_client.py - camera_manager.py - config.py - hardware.py - laser_manager.py - logger_manager.py - main.py - network.py - ota_manager.py - power.py - shot_id_generator.py - time_sync.py - version.py - vision.py
但要注意:你当前最敏感的“盐值/口令规则/HTTP header 逻辑/OTA 策略”都在这些会打包的文件里(尤其是 network.py、ota_manager.py、config.py
3. 最有效的“防黑”措施(比隐藏更关键)
把“password=device_id+.” 改为真正的 per-device secret设备出厂烧录服务端保存或服务端下发公钥设备用私钥签名
所有上报/控制命令加签名 + nonce/timestamp + 服务端防重放(别人抓到一次包也不能复用)
OTA 包必须做签名校验(设备端内置公钥,下载后验签通过才应用)
TLS 必须做证书校验/最好做 pinning至少别用 auth=0
如果你告诉我:你们服务端目前能不能改协议(例如新增签名字段、下发 challenge、做 OTA 签名),我可以按“最小改动但提升最大安全”的顺序,帮你规划一套从现状平滑升级的方案。

37
main.py
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@@ -252,14 +252,6 @@ def cmd_str():
try:
frame = camera_manager.read_frame()
# 先检测靶心以获取距离(用于计算激光点)
# 第一次检测不使用激光点,仅用于获取距离
result_img_temp, center_temp, radius_temp, method_temp, best_radius1_temp, ellipse_params_temp = detect_circle_v3(frame, None)
# 计算距离
distance_m = estimate_distance(best_radius1_temp) if best_radius1_temp else None
# 根据距离动态计算激光点坐标(如果未检测到靶心,使用硬编码值或默认值)
laser_point_method = None # 记录激光点选择方法
if config.HARDCODE_LASER_POINT:
# 硬编码模式:使用硬编码值
@@ -272,15 +264,13 @@ def cmd_str():
logger_manager.logger.info(f"[算法] 使用校准值: {laser_manager.laser_point}")
elif distance_m and distance_m > 0:
# 动态计算模式:根据距离计算激光点
# 先检测靶心以获取距离(用于计算激光点)
# 第一次检测不使用激光点,仅用于获取距离
result_img_temp, center_temp, radius_temp, method_temp, best_radius1_temp, ellipse_params_temp = detect_circle_v3(frame, None)
# 计算距离
distance_m = estimate_distance(best_radius1_temp) if best_radius1_temp else None
laser_point = laser_manager.calculate_laser_point_from_distance(distance_m)
laser_point_method = "dynamic"
logger_manager.logger.info(f"[算法] 使用比例尺: {laser_point}")
else:
# 未检测到靶心且未启用硬编码:使用默认激光点或从配置文件加载
laser_point = laser_manager.laser_point
laser_point_method = "default"
logger_manager.logger.info(f"[算法] 使用默认值: {laser_point}")
if laser_point is None:
logger = logger_manager.logger
if logger:
@@ -290,22 +280,9 @@ def cmd_str():
x, y = laser_point
# 绘制激光十字线
color = image.Color(config.LASER_COLOR[0], config.LASER_COLOR[1], config.LASER_COLOR[2])
frame.draw_line(
int(x - config.LASER_LENGTH), int(y),
int(x + config.LASER_LENGTH), int(y),
color, config.LASER_THICKNESS
)
frame.draw_line(
int(x), int(y - config.LASER_LENGTH),
int(x), int(y + config.LASER_LENGTH),
color, config.LASER_THICKNESS
)
frame.draw_circle(int(x), int(y), 1, color, config.LASER_THICKNESS)
# 重新检测靶心(使用计算出的激光点)
# 检测靶心
result_img, center, radius, method, best_radius1, ellipse_params = detect_circle_v3(frame, laser_point)
camera_manager.show(result_img)
# 计算偏移与距离(如果检测到靶心)

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@@ -210,6 +210,64 @@ class OTAManager:
self.logger.error(f"[OTA] 错误:{downloaded_file} 不存在")
return False
# ====== 第一步:如果是 AEAD 加密包,先解密成临时 zip再走原有 unzip 流程) ======
downloaded_file_original = downloaded_file
decrypted_tmp_zip = None
try:
magic = b"AROTAE1" # must match packager/C++ side
is_enc_ext = downloaded_file.lower().endswith((".enc", ".zip.enc"))
is_enc_magic = False
try:
with open(downloaded_file, "rb") as f:
head = f.read(len(magic))
is_enc_magic = (head == magic)
except Exception:
is_enc_magic = False
if is_enc_ext or is_enc_magic:
# Choose output zip path (same dir)
tmp_zip = downloaded_file
if tmp_zip.lower().endswith(".zip.enc"):
tmp_zip = tmp_zip[:-4] # remove ".enc" -> ".zip"
elif tmp_zip.lower().endswith(".enc"):
tmp_zip = tmp_zip[:-4]
if not tmp_zip.lower().endswith(".zip"):
tmp_zip = tmp_zip + ".zip"
else:
tmp_zip = tmp_zip + ".zip"
decrypted_tmp_zip = tmp_zip
# Remove stale tmp if exists
try:
if os.path.exists(decrypted_tmp_zip):
os.remove(decrypted_tmp_zip)
except Exception:
pass
self.logger.info(f"[OTA] 检测到加密包,开始解密: {downloaded_file} -> {decrypted_tmp_zip}")
ok = False
try:
core = getattr(network_manager, "_netcore", None)
if core and hasattr(core, "decrypt_ota_file"):
ok = bool(core.decrypt_ota_file(downloaded_file, decrypted_tmp_zip))
else:
import archery_netcore as _netcore
ok = bool(_netcore.decrypt_ota_file(downloaded_file, decrypted_tmp_zip))
except Exception as e:
self.logger.error(f"[OTA] 解密异常: {e}")
ok = False
if not ok or (not os.path.exists(decrypted_tmp_zip)):
self.logger.error("[OTA] 解密失败,终止更新")
return False
downloaded_file = decrypted_tmp_zip
self.logger.info(f"[OTA] 解密成功后续使用明文ZIP: {downloaded_file}")
except Exception as e:
self.logger.error(f"[OTA] 解密流程异常: {e}")
return False
# 备份
backup_base = config.BACKUP_BASE
backup_dir = None
@@ -437,17 +495,35 @@ class OTAManager:
# 清理下载文件
try:
if os.path.exists(downloaded_file):
# 删除下载的文件
# 删除下载的文件(可能包含:原始加密包 + 临时明文zip
files_to_remove = []
try:
if 'downloaded_file_original' in locals() and downloaded_file_original:
files_to_remove.append(downloaded_file_original)
except Exception:
pass
try:
if 'decrypted_tmp_zip' in locals() and decrypted_tmp_zip:
files_to_remove.append(decrypted_tmp_zip)
except Exception:
pass
# 兼容:如果变量不存在,至少清理当前 downloaded_file
if not files_to_remove:
files_to_remove = [downloaded_file]
removed_any = False
for fp in list(dict.fromkeys(files_to_remove)):
try:
os.remove(downloaded_file)
self.logger.info(f"[OTA] 已删除下载文件: {downloaded_file}")
if fp and os.path.exists(fp):
os.remove(fp)
removed_any = True
self.logger.info(f"[OTA] 已删除下载文件: {fp}")
except Exception as e:
self.logger.warning(f"[OTA] 删除下载文件失败(可忽略): {e}")
# 尝试删除时间戳目录(如果为空)
try:
download_dir = os.path.dirname(downloaded_file)
download_dir = os.path.dirname(files_to_remove[0] if files_to_remove else downloaded_file)
if download_dir.startswith("/tmp/download/"):
# 检查时间戳目录是否为空
if os.path.exists(download_dir):
@@ -567,7 +643,7 @@ class OTAManager:
# 根据文件扩展名判断是否为二进制文件
filename_lower = filename.lower()
is_binary = filename_lower.endswith(('.zip', '.bin', '.tar', '.gz', '.exe', '.dll', '.so', '.dylib'))
is_binary = filename_lower.endswith(('.zip', '.zip.enc', '.enc', '.bin', '.tar', '.gz', '.exe', '.dll', '.so', '.dylib'))
if is_binary:
# 二进制文件:使用二进制模式写入

View File

@@ -5,11 +5,17 @@
根据 app.yaml 中列出的文件,打包成 zip 文件
版本号从 version.py 中读取
"""
import argparse
import os
import yaml
import zipfile
from datetime import datetime
import sys
import secrets
MAGIC = b"AROTAE1" # 7 bytes: Archery OTA Encrypted v1
GCM_NONCE_LEN = 12
GCM_TAG_LEN = 16
# 添加当前目录到路径,以便导入 version 模块
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
@@ -91,8 +97,63 @@ def create_zip_package(app_info, files, output_dir='.', base_dir='.'):
return None
def _validate_key_hex(key_hex: str) -> bytes:
if not isinstance(key_hex, str):
raise ValueError("aead key must be hex string")
key_hex = key_hex.strip().lower()
if key_hex.startswith("0x"):
key_hex = key_hex[2:]
if len(key_hex) != 64:
raise ValueError("aead key must be 64 hex chars (32 bytes)")
try:
key = bytes.fromhex(key_hex)
except Exception as e:
raise ValueError(f"invalid hex key: {e}")
if len(key) != 32:
raise ValueError("aead key must be 32 bytes")
return key
def encrypt_zip_aead(zip_path: str, key_hex: str, out_ext: str = ".enc") -> str:
"""
Encrypt the whole zip file as one blob:
output format: MAGIC(7) | nonce(12) | ciphertext(N) | tag(16)
using AES-256-GCM (AEAD).
"""
# Lazy import: packaging-only dependency
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
except Exception as e:
raise RuntimeError(
"Missing dependency: cryptography. Install with: pip install cryptography. "
f"Import error: {e}"
)
key = _validate_key_hex(key_hex)
with open(zip_path, "rb") as f:
plain = f.read()
nonce = secrets.token_bytes(GCM_NONCE_LEN)
aesgcm = AESGCM(key)
ct_and_tag = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, plain, None) # ciphertext || tag (16 bytes)
enc_path = zip_path + out_ext if out_ext else (zip_path + ".enc")
with open(enc_path, "wb") as f:
f.write(MAGIC)
f.write(nonce)
f.write(ct_and_tag)
return enc_path
def main():
"""主函数"""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="打包 app.yaml 文件列表到 zip并可选进行 AES-256-GCM 加密输出 .enc")
parser.add_argument("--aead-key-hex", default=None, help="AES-256-GCM key (64 hex chars = 32 bytes). If set, output encrypted file.")
parser.add_argument("--keep-zip", action="store_true", help="Keep the plaintext zip when encryption is enabled.")
parser.add_argument("--out-ext", default=".enc", help="Encrypted output extension appended to zip path. Default: .enc (produces *.zip.enc)")
args = parser.parse_args()
print("=" * 60)
print("应用打包脚本")
print("=" * 60)
@@ -139,6 +200,23 @@ def main():
zip_path = create_zip_package(app_info, existing_files)
if zip_path:
enc_path = None
if args.aead_key_hex:
try:
enc_path = encrypt_zip_aead(zip_path, args.aead_key_hex, out_ext=args.out_ext)
enc_size = os.path.getsize(enc_path)
print(f"\n[SUCCESS] AEAD加密完成: {os.path.basename(enc_path)} ({enc_size:,} bytes)")
print(f" 文件路径: {os.path.abspath(enc_path)}")
if not args.keep_zip:
try:
os.remove(zip_path)
print(f"[INFO] 已删除明文zip: {os.path.basename(zip_path)}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[WARNING] 删除明文zip失败可忽略: {e}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"\n[ERROR] AEAD加密失败: {e}")
print("[ERROR] 保留明文zip用于排查。")
print("\n" + "=" * 60)
print("打包成功完成!")
print("=" * 60)

208
shoot_manager.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
import config
from camera_manager import camera_manager
from laser_manager import laser_manager
from logger_manager import logger_manager
from network import network_manager
from power import get_bus_voltage, voltage_to_percent
from vision import estimate_distance, detect_circle_v3, save_shot_image
from maix import camera, display, image, app, time, uart, pinmap, i2c
def analyze_shot(frame, laser_point=None):
"""
分析射箭结果算法部分可迁移到C++
:param frame: 图像帧
:param laser_point: 激光点坐标 (x, y)
:return: 包含分析结果的字典
"""
logger = logger_manager.logger
# 先检测靶心以获取距离(用于计算激光点)
result_img_temp, center_temp, radius_temp, method_temp, best_radius1_temp, ellipse_params_temp = detect_circle_v3(
frame, None)
# 计算距离
distance_m = estimate_distance(best_radius1_temp) if best_radius1_temp else None
# 根据距离动态计算激光点坐标
laser_point_method = None
if config.HARDCODE_LASER_POINT:
laser_point = laser_manager.laser_point
laser_point_method = "hardcode"
elif laser_manager.has_calibrated_point():
laser_point = laser_manager.laser_point
laser_point_method = "calibrated"
if logger:
logger.info(f"[算法] 使用校准值: {laser_manager.laser_point}")
elif distance_m and distance_m > 0:
laser_point = laser_manager.calculate_laser_point_from_distance(distance_m)
laser_point_method = "dynamic"
if logger:
logger.info(f"[算法] 使用比例尺: {laser_point}")
else:
laser_point = laser_manager.laser_point
laser_point_method = "default"
if logger:
logger.info(f"[算法] 使用默认值: {laser_point}")
if laser_point is None:
return {
"success": False,
"reason": "laser_point_not_initialized"
}
x, y = laser_point
# 绘制激光十字线
color = image.Color(config.LASER_COLOR[0], config.LASER_COLOR[1], config.LASER_COLOR[2])
frame.draw_line(
int(x - config.LASER_LENGTH), int(y),
int(x + config.LASER_LENGTH), int(y),
color, config.LASER_THICKNESS
)
frame.draw_line(
int(x), int(y - config.LASER_LENGTH),
int(x), int(y + config.LASER_LENGTH),
color, config.LASER_THICKNESS
)
frame.draw_circle(int(x), int(y), 1, color, config.LASER_THICKNESS)
# 重新检测靶心(使用计算出的激光点)
result_img, center, radius, method, best_radius1, ellipse_params = detect_circle_v3(frame, laser_point)
# 计算偏移与距离
if center and radius:
dx, dy = laser_manager.compute_laser_position(center, (x, y), radius, method)
distance_m = estimate_distance(best_radius1)
else:
dx, dy = None, None
distance_m = None
# 返回分析结果
return {
"success": True,
"result_img": result_img,
"center": center,
"radius": radius,
"method": method,
"best_radius1": best_radius1,
"ellipse_params": ellipse_params,
"dx": dx,
"dy": dy,
"distance_m": distance_m,
"laser_point": laser_point,
"laser_point_method": laser_point_method
}
def process_shot(adc_val):
"""
处理射箭事件(逻辑控制部分)
:param adc_val: ADC触发值
:return: None
"""
logger = logger_manager.logger
try:
frame = camera_manager.read_frame()
# 调用算法分析
analysis_result = analyze_shot(frame)
if not analysis_result.get("success"):
reason = analysis_result.get("reason", "unknown")
if logger:
logger.warning(f"[MAIN] 射箭分析失败: {reason}")
time.sleep_ms(100)
return
# 提取分析结果
result_img = analysis_result["result_img"]
center = analysis_result["center"]
radius = analysis_result["radius"]
method = analysis_result["method"]
ellipse_params = analysis_result["ellipse_params"]
dx = analysis_result["dx"]
dy = analysis_result["dy"]
distance_m = analysis_result["distance_m"]
laser_point = analysis_result["laser_point"]
laser_point_method = analysis_result["laser_point_method"]
x, y = laser_point
camera_manager.show(result_img)
if not (center and radius) and logger:
logger.warning("[MAIN] 未检测到靶心,但会保存图像")
# 读取电量
voltage = get_bus_voltage()
battery_percent = voltage_to_percent(voltage)
# 生成射箭ID
from shot_id_generator import shot_id_generator
shot_id = shot_id_generator.generate_id()
if logger:
logger.info(f"[MAIN] 射箭ID: {shot_id}")
# 保存图像
save_shot_image(
result_img,
center,
radius,
method,
ellipse_params,
(x, y),
distance_m,
shot_id=shot_id,
photo_dir=config.PHOTO_DIR if config.SAVE_IMAGE_ENABLED else None
)
# 构造上报数据
inner_data = {
"shot_id": shot_id,
"x": float(dx) if dx is not None else 200.0,
"y": float(dy) if dy is not None else 200.0,
"r": 90.0,
"d": round((distance_m or 0.0) * 100),
"d_laser": 0.0,
"d_laser_quality": 0,
"m": method if method else "no_target",
"adc": adc_val,
"laser_method": laser_point_method,
"target_x": float(x),
"target_y": float(y),
}
if ellipse_params:
(ell_center, (width, height), angle) = ellipse_params
inner_data["ellipse_major_axis"] = float(max(width, height))
inner_data["ellipse_minor_axis"] = float(min(width, height))
inner_data["ellipse_angle"] = float(angle)
inner_data["ellipse_center_x"] = float(ell_center[0])
inner_data["ellipse_center_y"] = float(ell_center[1])
else:
inner_data["ellipse_major_axis"] = None
inner_data["ellipse_minor_axis"] = None
inner_data["ellipse_angle"] = None
inner_data["ellipse_center_x"] = None
inner_data["ellipse_center_y"] = None
report_data = {"cmd": 1, "data": inner_data}
network_manager.safe_enqueue(report_data, msg_type=2, high=True)
if logger:
if center and radius:
logger.info(f"射箭事件已加入发送队列已检测到靶心ID: {shot_id}")
else:
logger.info(f"射箭事件已加入发送队列未检测到靶心已保存图像ID: {shot_id}")
# 闪一下激光(射箭反馈)
laser_manager.flash_laser(1000)
time.sleep_ms(100)
except Exception as e:
if logger:
logger.error(f"[MAIN] 图像处理异常: {e}")
import traceback
logger.error(traceback.format_exc())
time.sleep_ms(100)

View File

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
应用版本号
每次 OTA 更新时,只需要更新这个文件中的版本号
"""
VERSION = '1.2.0'
VERSION = '1.2.1'
# 1.2.0 开始使用C++编译成.so替换部分代码
# 1.2.1 ota使用加密包

View File

@@ -609,34 +609,34 @@ def save_shot_image(result_img, center, radius, method, ellipse_params,
# 转换图像为 OpenCV 格式以便绘制
img_cv = image.image2cv(result_img, False, False)
# # 确保激光十字线被绘制使用OpenCV在图像上绘制确保可见性
# laser_color = (config.LASER_COLOR[0], config.LASER_COLOR[1], config.LASER_COLOR[2])
# thickness = max(config.LASER_THICKNESS, 2) # 至少2像素宽确保可见
# length = max(config.LASER_LENGTH, 10) # 至少10像素长
# # 绘制激光十字线(水平线)
# cv2.line(img_cv,
# (int(x - length), int(y)),
# (int(x + length), int(y)),
# laser_color, thickness)
# # 绘制激光十字线(垂直线)
# cv2.line(img_cv,
# (int(x), int(y - length)),
# (int(x), int(y + length)),
# laser_color, thickness)
# # 绘制激光点
# cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), max(thickness, 3), laser_color, -1)
# 在 vision.py 的 save_shot_image 函数中替换第598-614行的代码
# 绘制激光点标注(使用空心圆圈,类似校准时的标注方式)
# 绘制激光十字线(保存图像时统一绘制,避免影响检测
laser_color = (config.LASER_COLOR[0], config.LASER_COLOR[1], config.LASER_COLOR[2])
thickness = 1 # 圆圈线宽
cross_thickness = int(max(getattr(config, "LASER_THICKNESS", 1), 1))
cross_length = int(max(getattr(config, "LASER_LENGTH", 10), 10))
# 绘制外圈半径10空心
cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), 10, laser_color, thickness)
# 绘制中圈半径5空心
cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), 5, laser_color, thickness)
# 绘制中心点半径2实心用于精确定位
# 水平线
cv2.line(
img_cv,
(int(x - cross_length), int(y)),
(int(x + cross_length), int(y)),
laser_color,
cross_thickness,
)
# 垂直线
cv2.line(
img_cv,
(int(x), int(y - cross_length)),
(int(x), int(y + cross_length)),
laser_color,
cross_thickness,
)
# 小点(与原 main.py 行为一致)
cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), 1, laser_color, cross_thickness)
# 额外的激光点标注(空心圆圈,便于肉眼查看)
ring_thickness = 1
cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), 10, laser_color, ring_thickness)
cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), 5, laser_color, ring_thickness)
cv2.circle(img_cv, (int(x), int(y)), 2, laser_color, -1)
# 如果检测到靶心,绘制靶心标注